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ALIENS AND EQUAL PROTECTION:
WHY NOT THE RIGHT TO VOTE?
Gerald M. Rosberg*
Alienage, the Supreme Court has recently insisted, is a suspect
classification. 1 Thus, statutes disadvantaging aliens as a class are
subject to strict judicial scrutiny and are held invalid unless justified
by some compelling state interest. The extension of this special
judicial solicitude to aliens is remarkable enough in view of the thinness of the precedential support and the imperfections of the analogy
between alienage and race, the paradigm suspect classification. But
it is all the more puzzling in that it has come at a time when the
Supreme Court, in no expansionist mood, has resisted the demand
of virtually every other group for this same judicial protection.
Still, if one concedes the premise that alienage is a suspect classification, one can fairly easily explain why a state may not deny aliens
welfare benefits2 or civil service employment3 or access to the bar. 4
But how can one explain why a state is permitted to deny aliens the
opportunity to vote, which every state in fact does? 5 Is it simply that
the case has not yet arisen and restrictions on aliens' voting will
sooner or later fall? I doubt that, since the Supreme Court has just
brushed aside, a case that raised the issue squarely, declaring that
the case did not even present a substantial federal question. 0 Alternatively, is the states' need to deny aliens the vote so obviously compelling that articulation of the reasons for that conclusion could serve
no useful purpose? I doubt that too, since the effect of raising the
issue is more often to provoke a reexamination of the premise that
alienage is a garden-variety suspect classification than it is to produce
a reasoned discussion of the supposed need to deny aliens the vote.

* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. B.A. 1968, Harvard
College; J.D. 1971, Harvard University.-E<I.
1. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
2. 403 U.S. 365.
3. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
4. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 97 S. Ct.
2120 (1977) (financial assistance for higher education); Examining Bd. v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (license to practice as civil engineer).
5. A. REITMAN & R. DAVIDSON, nm ELECTION PROCESS: VOTING LAWS AND PRO·
CEDURES 8-9 (1972).
6. Skafte v. Rorex, - Colo. -, 553 P.2d 830 (1976); appeal dismissed, 91 S.
Ct. 1638 (1977).
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A constitutional right of at least some aliens to vote does not
seem to me at all unthinkable. 7 Throughout much of the nineteenth
century and part of the twentieth, aliens enjoyed the right to vote
in a great many states. 8 The states that extended the franchise to
aliens plainly did not believe that they were acting under constitutional compulsion. But given our present understanding of the
mission of the equal protection clause, much can now be said in defense of such a constitutional right. My purpose here is to outline
the case that might be made for the right of aliens to vote. I should
make clear at the outset, however, that this is an area where one
must proceed with caution, for the Supreme Court, despite its now
numerous incursions into the thicket of politics and voting, has barely
begun to construct a framework for analyzing questions concerning
the nature of political representation and the definition of a political
community. 9 Indeed, the inscrutability of these questions and the
sense of unease produced by discussion of them may account for the
general reluctance to face squarely the issues raised by alien
suffrage.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

As background it may be useful to begin with a brief survey of
the historical practice concerning aliens' voting. My purpose is not
just to demonstrate that allowing aliens to vote was thought acceptable throughout a substantial part of American history, including
periods characterized by much more xenophobia than we are familiar
with today. More important, the historical experience rebuts the
argument that the terms "citizen" and "voter" are synonymous and
that one cannot, therefore, speak coherently of a right of aliens to
vote. In this country aliens have often enjoyed the right of suffrage.
And, by the same token, a great many citizens have not.
Surprisingly little has been written on the history of suffrage in
the United States, and the few apparently reliable sources are so preoccupied with the demise of property, sex, and race qualifications
7. The Commission of the Common Market has under study a proposal to extend
voting rights in each of the member countries to residents who are nationals of one
of the other member countries. See Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Implementation of Point 11 of the Final Communique Issued at the
European Summit Held in Paris on 9 and 10 December 1974, in BULL. OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 26 (Supp. 7, 1975).
See also COMMISSION FOR THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROGRAM FOR 1977, at 41 (1977).
8. See text at notes 31-36 infra.
9. Casper, Apportionment and the Right To Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny,
1973 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 2.
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that it is hard to obtain a clear picture of how aliens were treated.
Most obscure, predictably, is the experience in the colonial period.
Generalizations are difficult not only because of the problem of determining how the formal rules of suffrage were translated into practice, 10 but also because the concept of citizenship did not have the
same meaning as it has today. Until the Constitution centralized the
power to naturalize aliens in the national government, no single
definition of citizenship was applicable throughout the American
states. 11 The question that must be asked, therefore, is what, if any,
voting rights were extended to persons that we would now consider
aliens-that is, persons neither born nor naturalized in the United
States nor born to American parents overseas.
The key to the early suffrage qualifications was property. In the
early colonial period, one commentator has pointed out, "the underlying idea was that a man's property entitled him to vote-not his
character, his nationality, beliefs, or residence, but his property."12
Even after other qualifications were added, the property requirement
remained central. Chilton Williamson maintains that the number of
potential voters excluded under the property tests may well have
been much smaller than is generally supposed, and it was almost certainly smaller than the number so excluded in England during the
comparable period. 13 But the property qualifications still cut deeply
and a significant percentage of the male citizenry was not permitted
to vote. Women were completely excluded even though their capacity to hold citizenship was not questioned. No one had to argue
that a man without property or a woman or an infant was not a citizen
and therefore not entitled to vote, since no one supposed that a
citizen was by definition a voter.14
At the same time that many persons we would now consider
citizens were barred from voting, evidently at least some that we
would now call aliens were allowed to vote. In the first place, requirements for naturalization of non-English subjects, at least if they
were Protestants, were apparently so relaxed at times in some of the
10. See C. WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY,
1760-1860, at 49 (1960).
11. IS'ee Tim F'EDERALisr No. 42, at 264-65 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1892).
12. K. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE. UNITED STATES 3 (2d ed. 1971),
Porter's examination of suffrage was written in 1918. That it was reprinted
more than 50 years later is less a tribute to the quality of the study than
an indication of the sparsity of more recent scholarly work in this area.
13. C. WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 22-39.
14. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874); 10 Qp, ATIY,
GEN. 385-87 (1863) (citizenship),
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colonies that many of the persons who voted as naturalized citizens
would not be considered naturalized under anything like the standards we now enforce. 15 Moreover, the colonial laws and charters
seldom imposed explicit political qualifications, in the sense of allegiance or citizenship. A number of the colonies did require that
electors be freemen, but outside of New England, where the term
had a technical meaning, the requirement was apparently read as
"not slave." In New England the term denoted formal enrollment
in the political community through a process that involved a residence requirement, the taking of an oath of allegiance, and in some
cases even a vote of the other electors. 16
The term most often used to define the electors in the colonial
charters and the early state constitutions was "inhabitants." A good
deal of doubt exists as to the manner in which that term was applied. 17 The author of one survey of colonial election laws concluded that as a general principle voting rights were not extended
to persons considered foreigners. 18 Another author identified several colonies that did require voters to be English subjects. 19 In
1811 the Justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
declared that "inhabitant" was synonymous with "citizen" and thus
under the state constitution only citizens could vote. 20 Similarly, a
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 11, at 265; F. VAN DYNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NATURALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1907); cf. C.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 87.
16. Bishop, History of Elections in the American Colonies, in 3 STUDIES IN HISTORY, EcONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 92-96 (1893).
17. The term "inhabitants" was used in the Articles of Confederation in a manner that illustrates this confusion. Article IV declared that "the free inhabitants
of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall
be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States;
and the people of each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade
and commerce." Madison noted that "[t]here is a confusion of language here, which
is remarkable. Why the terms free inhabitants are used in one part of the article,
free citizens in another, and people in another . . . cannot easily be determined."
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 11, at 265 (emphasis original). "Citizens" and
"inhabitants" could be read as describing different but overlapping categories of persons or as being synonymous. Madison evidently thought the first reading more
plausible, but he strongly disapproved of the article under either interpretation. Id.
18. A. MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 474-75 (1905). See also s. MAcCLINTOCK, ALIENS UNDER THE
FEDERAL LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (1909).
19. See Bishop, supra note 16, at 52-53.
20. Opinion of the Justices, 7 Mass. 523, 525 (1811). See also Opinion of
the Justices, 122 Mass. 594 (1877). Cf. 5 G. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 201 (1888) ("for twelve years, free inhabitants and citizens
were in American state papers convertible terms, sometimes used one for the other,
and sometimes, for the sake of perspicuity, redundantly joined together").
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New Jersey judge writing in 1855 maintained that when the state's
first constitution was adopted the term "citizen" was not yet in common use, but the term "inhabitants" described those persons who
would subsequently be called citizens. 21
Still, there is evidence indicating that some aliens were allowed
to vote as "inhabitants" of the states in which they lived. Unnaturalized French Huguenots voted in South Carolina in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 22 Unnaturalized German immigrants voted in Pennsylvania in the middle years of the eighteenth
century, 23 and an early Pennsylvania decision upheld the right of an
alien "inhabitant" to vote in a borough election in Pittsburgh, 24 just
as a Vermont decision upheld the right of an alien resident to vote
in a school election. 25 In 1840, a justice of the Illinois Supreme
Court emphatically denied that the terms "citizen" and "inhabitant"
were interchangeable26 and cited evidence of aliens voting as "inhabitants" of the Northwest Territory pursuant to the Ordinance of
1787 and subsequent congressional legislation. 27 And it has been
conceded by one historian who strongly disapproved of alien suffrage
that "the rather vague qualification of citizenship existing in less than
half a dozen colonies" during the pre-Revolutionary period disappeared temporarily late in the eighteenth century. 28 Yet it is precisely this period that marks the emergence of a national concept
21. State v. Deshler, 25 N.J.L. 177, 186 (1855) (separate opinion of Haines,

J.).
22. A. McKINLEY, supra note 18, at 131-42; Bishop, supra note 16, at 53.
23. C. WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 52.
24. Stewart v. Foster, 2 Binn. 110 (Pa. 1809).
25. Woodcock v. Bolster, 35 Vt. 632 (1863).
26. Spragins v. Houghton, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 377 (1840). As counsel for appellant, Stephen A. Douglas argued that an otherwise qualified alien was entitled under
the state constitution to vote as an "inhabitant" of the state. Justice Smith's opinion
(two other Justices concurred in the result) cited Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana as
states (and, in an earlier period, territories) in which aliens had been allowed to
vote. He acknowledged cases in other states, apparently New York and Massachusetts, where "inhabitant" and "citizen" were read as synonymous, but he dismissed
these precedents out of hand.
27. 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) at 403. The Ordinance of 1787 provided that "a freehold
in fifty acres of land in the district, having been a citizen of one of the states,
and being resident in the district, or the like freehold and two years residence in
the district, shall be necessary to qualify a man as an elector of a representative."
2 FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS 959 (Thorpe ed. 1909).
28. A. McCuLLOCH, SUFFRAGE AND !Ts PROBLEMS 36 (1929). See also K.
PORTER, supra note 12, at 20. On June 7, 1776, the Continental Congress declared
"that all persons abiding within any of the United Colonies and deriving protection
from the laws of the same owe allegiance to the said laws, and are members of such
colony." Quoted in F. FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 2 (1906).
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of citizenship. The Constitution itself declares that the President,
representatives, and senators (though not judges) must be citizens
of the United States, and in 1790 Congress passed a statute implementing its power to provide for the naturalization of aliens and at
the same time conferring United States citizenship on the foreignborn children of American parents. 29 The passage of and controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts hardly suggests a lack of
sensitivity to the difference between citizen and alien. 30 Nevertheless, there was little effort in the latter part of the eighteenth
century to declare specifically that only citizens could vote, and voting by unnaturalized aliens may well have been common during this
period.
Early in the nineteenth century the situation began to change.
Whereas Ohio was admitted as a state in 1803 with a constitution
that defined the electors as the inhabitants of the state, Louisiana's
constitution at the time of its admission in 1812 spoke of the citizens
as voters, as did the constitutions of Indiana ( 1816), Mississippi
(1817), Alabama (1819), Maine (1820), and Missouri (1821).
Illinois, admitted in 1818 with a constitution that identified the inhabitants of the state as the electors, was the only exception to this
pattern. It apparently allowed aliens to vote until a constitutional
change in 1848.31 At the same time as the new states were defining
the electors as citizens, the states previously admitted were moving
in the same direction. Maryland changed its constitutional definition
of voters from "inhabitants" to "citizens" in 1810, as did Connecticut
in 1818, New York and Massachusetts in 1821, Vermont in 1828,
and Virginia in 1830. The explanation for this increasing tendency
to equate voting with citizenship may lie in the "rise of national
consciousness" engendered by the War of 181232 or in the increasing
29. Act of March 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103. For naturalization the Act required
two years of residence, proof of good moral character, and an oath to support the
Constitution.
30. But cf. A. McCuLLOCH, supra note 28, at 36 ("The absence of a test of
citizenship for the franchise would indicate also that the American people were not
yet politically conscious of being a new nation").
31. See Spragins v. Houghton, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 377 (1840) (settled interpretation
of state constitution from its inception that alien inhabitants could vote). Article
VI of the stace constitution of 1848 declared that the electors were to be the citizens
of the state and those persons who were inhabitants of the state at the time of the
adoption of the constitution. 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS, supra note 27,
at 1002.
32. See A. McCuLLOCH, supra note 28, at 41. Justice Smith's opinion in Spragins
v. Houghton, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 377 (1840), see note 26 supra, refers to an unreported
Ohio decision of 1817 upholding the denial of the vote in 1814 to a citizen of Great
Britain named Johnston, even though, the opinion maintained, aliens were generally
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public dismay at the arrival of large numbers of new immigrants who
were not of English stock and who were thought incapable of ready
assimilation.
Ironically, at the same time that hostility to the foreignbom was
producing strenuous demands in some states for literacy tests and
other devices that would effectively exclude even naturalized immigrants from the polls, a significant movement was developing in other
states to give aliens the vote. In 1848 Wisconsin was admitted as
a state with a constitution that expressly extended the right of suffrage to aliens who had declared their intention of becoming citizens.
The declaration that Wisconsin had in mind was to be made pursuant
to the federal naturalization laws, which required for naturalization
five-years' residence in the United States and a declaration of intent
to become a citizen made two years before naturalization. The declaration was not in any sense binding, and an alien who had made
it could remain in the United States as an alien indefinitely. It has
been suggested, however, that many of the supporters of the Wisconsin scheme simply did not understand it, in that they assumed the
declaration was somehow tantamount to naturalization or that it could
only be made after two-years' residence, 33 when in fact the declaration could be made at any time after arrival, but naturalization could
not follow within a two-year period. In any case, the Wisconsin formula proved attractive to other states, in part because they feared
that failure to adopt the same rule would give Wisconsin a competitive advantage in attracting immigrants.34 By the outbreak of the
Civil War an alien declarant could vote in state and federal elections
in Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
The extension of the franchise to aliens was a source of much
unhappiness to those who feared that the new immigrants would
have an adverse impact on American institutions. At a convention
in February 1856, the Know-Nothing Party denounced Wisconsin
and other states that had allowed aliens to vote. But their real concern was not so much with aliens as with "foreigners," and their goal
was to restrict the political power of all persons of foreign birth. The
party's platform included a demand for a 21-year residence requireallowed to vote in Ohio during this period. Although he did not have access to a
written opinion disclosing the reasoning of the Ohio court, Justice Smith suggested
that perhaps Johnston was denied the vote as an enemy alien, rather than as an
alien simpliciter. 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) at 412-13.
33. K. PORTER, supra note 12, at 120.
34. See Chaney, Alien Suffrage, in 2 PUBLICATIONS OF THE MICH. POL. Sci. A.
130, 134 (1894).
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ment for naturalization. 35 But the practice of alien voting survived
the attacks, and after the Civil War it spread to at least thirteen more
states, all of them in the South or West and all of them evidently
anxious to lure new settlers. 36 In each case the state adopted the
Wisconsin formula and allowed alien declarants to vote, although
some imposed a requirement of residence in the state for a certain
period before or after the declaration. In addition, alien declarants
were permitted to vote under the congressional legislation establishing the territorial governments of Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Washington, and Wyoming. By the end of the nineteenth century
nearly one-half of the states and territories had had some experience
with voting by aliens, and for some the experience lasted more than
half a century.
The movement away from alien suffrage began late in the nineteenth century and continued into the twentieth, as the nation's hostility to foreigners increased. The assassination of President McKinley has been cited as a factor that moved some states away from alien
suffrage, 37 and it was doubtless no accident that four of the last states
to permit voting by aliens moved during the First World War to bar
them from the polls. 38 Indiana and Texas abolished alien suffrage
35. See K. PORTER, supra note 12, at 128-29; F. FRANKLIN, supra note 28, at
278-300.
36. Determining precisely which states allowed aliens to vote is a difficult task.
Thorpe's compilation of federal and state constitutions, supra note 27, is a convenient
source of constitutional provisions bearing on the right to vote. It reveals that at
one time or another the constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Texas extended the right of suffrage to aliens. In some cases, however, Thorpe
provides only an amended version of a state constitution, and there is no way to
tell on the face of it whether alien suffrage was at one time permitted. For example, Minnesota's first constitution included an alien suffrage provision, MINN.
CONST. of 1857, art. III, § 1; see City of Minneapolis v. Reum, 56 F. 576 (8th
Cir. 1893 ), but Thorpe offers only an 1896 version of the article on elective franchise, and in that year alien declarants lost the right to vote. 4 STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 2007. Other states may have granted aliens a
statutory right to vote even though the constitution of the state did not itself require
alien suffrage. Few of the commentators make an effort to identify the particular
states that allowed aliens to vote. See, e.g., Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. PoL. ScI. REV. 114 (1931) (noting that at least 22 states and territories at one time allowed aliens to vote, but not identifying more than a few of
them). And some of those who have made the effort are in at least some instances
simply wrong. Porter, for example, describes the Michigan constitutional convention
of 1850 as narrowly defeating an alien suffrage provision. K. PORTER, supra note
12, at 124-25. In fact, alien suffrage was established in the state constitution of
1850, and it persisted until a constitutional amendment ended the practice in 1894,
subject to a grandfather clause. 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
27, at 1956.
37. See A. McCULLOCH, supra note 28, at 53.
38. By constitutional amendment alien suffrage was eliminated in Kansas, Ne-
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in 1921, Missouri followed in 1924, and Arkansas brought the era
to a close by ending alien suffrage in 1926. One commentator has
pointed out that the election of 1928 was the first in more than a
century in which no alien had the right to vote for any national, state
or local office. 39 The irony of it all is that the disappearance of alien
suffrage corresponded almost perfectly with the end of the era of
open and unlimited immigration. At the same time that the national
government was making it increasingly difficult to get into the
United States, the states were taking political privileges away from
the aliens who had managed to demonstrate the necessary qualifications and gain admission.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION ON
ALIEN SUFFRAGE

To my knowledge no state has seriously considered extending
the franchise to aliens during the past half century, and I very much
doubt that any state would now make the move except at the insistence of the Supreme Court. And the Supreme Court's inclination
on the issue is not at all in doubt. The Court has not been very
helpful, however, in explaining why aliens have no right to vote.
The issue was raised squarely in a recent Colorado case, Skafte v.
Rorex, 40 and the Supreme Court refused to entertain an appeal from
the state court's decision "that no such right exists. The order dismissing the appeal for want of a substantial federal question offered no
explanation beyond a citation to two recent cases, Sugarman v.
Dougall41 and Kramer v. Union Free School District. 42 In Sugarman,
which held unconstitutional a blanket exclusion of aliens from New
York's competitive civil service, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the
Court had gone out of its way to address the question of alien voting:
This Court has never held that aliens have a constitutional right to
vote or to hold high public office under the Equal Protection Clause.
Indeed, implicit in many of this Court's voting rights decisions is the
notion that citizenship is a permissible criterion for limiting such
rights. 43
braska, and South Dakota in 1918. A Texas statute of that same year barred aliens
from voting in primary elections. See Aylsworth, supra note 36, at 115.
39. Aylsworth, supra note 36, at 114.
40. -Colo.-, 553 P.2d 830 (1976), appeal dismissed, 91 S. Ct. 1638 (1977),
41. 413 U.S. 634 (1973 ).
42. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
43. 413 U.S. at 648-49.
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The issue of alien suffrage was not squarely presented in any of the
cases cited by the Court. And while it is true that the Court has
several times suggested that citizenship might be a permissible voter
qualification, it has never made any significant effort to explain the
basis for that suggestion. The only explanation offered in Sugarman
is the rather puzzling remark that, even though state voter qualifications ·are subject to scrutiny under the equal protection clause, "our
scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives." 44 I would
have thought that the definition of a state's constitutional prerogatives in this regard was the question and not the answer. Justice
Blackmun's opinion offers no further guidance. 45
Kramer, the second of the cases cited in support of the dismissal
of the Colorado appeal, had also been cited in Sugarman as one of
the many cases in which it was "implicit . . . that citizenship is a
permissible criterion" for limiting voting rights. The relevant text
in Kramer is no help at all:
At the outset, it is important to note what is not at issue in this case.
The requirements of § 2012 that school district voters must (1) be
citizens of the United States, (2) be bona fide residents of the school
district, and (3) be at least 21 years of age are not challenged. Appellant agrees that the States have the power to impose reasonable
citizenship, age, and residency requirements on the availability of the
ballot. 46
44. 413 U.S. at 648.
45. Justice Blackmun did go on to say, in apparent explanation of the quoted
sentence concerning a state's constitutional prerogatives, that "[t]his is no more than
a recognition of a State's historical power to exclude aliens from participation in
its democratic political institutions." 413 U.S. at 648 (citing Pope v. Williams,
193 U.S. 621, 632-34 (1904), and Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892) ).
Pope, however, did not concern the right of aliens to vote. At issue was the right
of a United States citizen who had recently moved from the District of Columbia
to Maryland to vote in a Maryland election. Maryland had refused to register him
because he had not, as required by state law, made a declaration at least one year
before the attempted registration of his intent to become a citizen and resident of
Maryland. The Supreme Court upheld the statute on the ground that state power
to legislate ''upon the subject of the elective franchise" was "unassailable." 193 U.S.
at 633-34. The Court went so far as to say that a state could constitutionally limit
the right to vote to native-born (as opposed to naturalized) citizens. This view
of limitless state power over the franchise is plainly repudiated in later cases, in
particular Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), and Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Boyd v. Thayer, like Pope, did not address the question of alien suffrage. An
attempt had been made to disqualify Boyd, the newly elected governor of Nebraska,
from taking office. It was said that he was not a citizen of the United States and
was therefore ineligible for the office under state law. By a tortuous process of
reasoning the Court concluded that Boyd was, in fact, a citizen of the United States,
and therefore it upheld his right to assume the office.
46. 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969) (emphasis original).
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To disparage the Sugarman and Kramer discussions of the issue
as dictum rather than holding is, if anything, to exaggerate their
significance. In neither case did the Court state flatly that aliens
have no constitutional right to vote, much less offer a rationale for
that conclusion. What Sugarman did say clearly was that classifications on the basis of alienage are suspect, while Kramer declared
that voting is a fundamental right. These two propositions are
crucial to the alien's argument for a right to vote. By citing the discussion of alien voting in Sugarman and Kramer, the Supreme Court
evidently wanted to show that even at the time it was formulating
these propositions it did not believe that they could be carried to the
point of establishing a right to vote for aliens. But that still leaves
us in need of some explanation of the reasons why they cannot be
carried that far. 47
The Court could perhaps have provided an answer in Skafte v.
Rorex by citing its 1974 decision in Richardson v. Ramirez. 48 In
that case, the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to state
laws denying felons the right to vote, viewing section 2 of the fourteenth amendment as dispositive of the issue. Section 2 declares
that when a state denies the right to vote to male citizens of the
United States who are at least twenty-one years old and who have
not been convicted of a crime, the state's representation in Congress
will be reduced in proportion to the number of such persons who
have been denied the right to vote. Clearly, the section does not
say that convicted felons have no right to vote. It provides only that
a particular sanction for state interference with the right to votereduction of congressional representation-will not be imposed
where those who are denied the vote are former felons. Of course,
the withholding of a sanction under section 2 is strong evidence that
at the time the amendment was adopted the denial of the vote to
felons was considered a legitimate exercise of state power. But
standing alone, that evidence should not have proved fatal to the
47. Another signal of the Supreme Court's views on the question of the alien's
right to vote is its summary affirmance of a three-judge district court decision up•
holding state and federal laws that exclude aliens from service on grand and petit
juries. Perkins v. Smith, 426 U.S. 913 (1976), aftg. 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md.
1974). The district court assumed for the sake of argument that strict scrutiny was
the appropriate standard of review, but it found that the state and federal governments had a compelling interest in barring aliens from jury service. There is surely
some basis for distinguishing the alien's interest in jury service from the interest
in voting. Yet in view of the district court's apparent assumption that the federal
and state governments have greater latitude in denying aliens political rights than
civil or economic rights, it seems clear that the district court would also have upheld
a statutory ban on the right of aliens to vote.
48. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).

April-May 1977]

Aliens and the Right To Vote

1103

claim that the state law is now unconstitutional under the equal protection clause, since the Supreme Court has recognized that concepts
of equality do evolve and that a practice deemed unobjectionable
in 1868 may be impermissibly discriminatory today. 49
In his opinion for the Court in Ramirez, Mr. Justice Rehnquist
was careful to avoid relying on the argument-made several times
by Mr. Justice Harlan but always rejected by the Court50-that section 2 was intended to be the exclusive remedy for any form of electoral discrimination. The fact that a discriminatory state practice
could occasion the sanction of reduced congressional representation
under section 2 of the fourteenth amendment does not, in other
words, rule out the possibility that the practice could be completely
enjoined under the equal protection clause of section 1.51 But Mr.
Justice Rehnquist argued in Ramirez that the withholding of a sanction under section 2 for the denial of the vote to convicted felons
amounted to an implicit validation of state laws denying felons the
vote, and he concluded that the equal protection clause of section
1 was not applicable as a test of the law's validity. The dissenters
pointed out that two years earlier the Supreme Court _had struck
down under the equal protection clause laws imposing a durational
residence qualification for voting, even though the durational residence qualification was considered just as acceptable in 1868 as the
preclusion of voting by felons. 52 The difference, Mr. Justice Rehnquist replied, was that durational residence requirements were not
explicitly exempted from the sanction of section 2, 53 although plainly
they were implicitly exempted. Thus, although it was appropriate
to test the durational residence requirement under the evolving
standards of the equal protection clause, the analogous requirement
that a voter have no felony conviction was immune from any equal
protection scrutiny.
As construed in Ramirez, section 2 of the fourteenth amendment
disposes of the claim that a denial of the vote to aliens is unconstitutional under section 1. Section 2 treats aliens and felons precisely
alike-a state that denies the vote to aliens is just as free from any
49. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
SO. Compare Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), and Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964), with 380 U.S. at 97-99 (Harlan, J. dissenting) and 377 U.S.
at 593-615 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. See generally Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" To
Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. Cr. REV. 33.
52. 418 U.S. at 76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. 418 U.S. at 54.
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sanction under section 2 as a state that denies the vote to felons.
And if one must infer from the absence of a sanction under section
2 that there can be no remedy under section 1, the aliens will inevitably lose. 54
In my view, the equal protection arguments for alien suffrage
warrant serious consideration, Ramirez notwithstanding. In the first
place, the Ramirez reading of section 2 may not endure. It goes
well beyond anything required by the language, history, or purpose
of the fourteenth amendment, 55 and it is hard to square with the
Court's earlier rejection of Justice Harlan's argument that section 2
ousts the equal protection clause in the area of voting rights. Moreover, even if section 2 is dispositive, it is not a very satisfying way
to dispose of the case because it resolves the equal protection arguments by making it unnecessary to consider them on the merits. If
those arguments are as strong as I believe them to be, one can
reasonably ask how equal protection analysis could have brought us
to a point where, but for the deus ex machina of section 2, state
laws denying aliens the vote would have to be held unconstitutional.
Is section 2 an anachronism that unfortunately compels us to ignore
the logic of the equal protection arguments, or is there something
seriously wrong with those arguments?
III.

THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM

A.

The Standard of Review

In the orthodox view, the world of equal protection review is
divided into two parts-strict scrutiny, which few state statutes can
evidently withstand, and restrained review, which most state statutes
can handle very nicely. To gain access to the area of strict scrutiny, the challenger of the state statute must demonstrate either that
54. In Skafte v. Rorex, - Colo. -, 553 P.2d 830 (1976), appeal dismissed,
97 S. Ct. 1638 (1977), the Colorado case that denied the alien's right to vote, the
state supreme court rejected the argument that § 2 of the fourteenth amendment, as construed in Ramirez, was dispositive. The court argued that § 2
was applicable only to the elections specifically mentioned in the section-elections
for national political office and for state legislative, judicial, and executive offices.
The election at issue in the Colorado case was a local school board election, to
which the court found § 2 inapplicable. The court's conclusion seems sound,
but it still leaves little room for the equal protection clause to operate. The court's
second argument-that the implicit approval of a citizenship requirement in § 2
does not warrant the conclusion that § 1 is inapplicable-is persuasive. Unfortunately, even though Ramirez is cited by the Colorado court as support for
this argument, 553 P.2d at 832, the argument is clearly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Ramirez.
55. See, e.g., Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 293, 304 (1976).
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the statute involves a suspect classification or that it denies a fundamental right. The denial to aliens of the right to vote would seem
an obvious candidate for the stricter standard of review, because
alienage stands near the top of the "suspectness" gradient (immediately next to race), and voting stands at the top of the gradient along
which rights are laid out in order of their importance. If one had
to imagine a case that called any more obviously for strict scrutiny,
it would have to be the explicit denial of the vote to a racial minority.
Of course, the system of equal protection analysis just described
is in a state of considerable disarray. General agreement no longer
exists on the number of different standards of review~ the rigor with
which the rational basis test is to be applied, or the extent to which
the fundamentality of the right is relevant to the choice of a standard
of review. But much remains intact. Some classifications are still
suspect, and alienage is plainly one of them. Although the right to
vote no longer enjoys quite the special place it held a few years ago
and the validity of any fundamental rights argument is now problematic, if any right is still considered fundamental it is the right to
vote. And to pass the strict scrutiny test a statutory classification
must still be predicated on a compelling state interest. Thus, despite
all the confusion of the last few years, a statute withholding from
aliens the right to vote would still seem to require testing under the
rigorous standards of strict scrutiny.
I don't think anyone knows precisely what combination of characteristics makes a class suspect for purposes of equal protection
analysis. But I have no doubt that a critical factor-perhaps the
single most important factor-is political powerlessness. It is the
discrete and insular minority, of which aliens as a class are a "prime
example," 56 that obtains the benefit of heightened judicial solicitude,
because such a minority requires "extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." 57 The relaxed standard of review
generally applicable to state legislation is said to rest on the presumption of its constitutionality. And that presumption rests in tum o.n
the expectation that all groups potentially affected by the legislation
have had an opportunity to express their views and pursue their interests in the legislative forum. Where a group is completely excluded from the legislative process the presumption of constitutionality cannot stand, and therefore the courts must scrutinize with
56. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citing United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938)).
57. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
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unusual strictness legislation that disadvantages the group. A state
statute or practice that has the purpose and effect of excluding the
group from the political process clearly requires the strictest review
of all, for it is the very fact of exclusion that made the classification
suspect and necessitated strict scrutiny in the first place. 58 Put another way, the invalidation of a statute that excludes the members
of a suspect class from participation in the political process is itself
a way of eliminating, over the long run to be sure, the need for strict
scrutiny. By protecting the members of the class from the majority's
efforts to keep them powerless, the Court can make its determination
of suspectness self-liquidating. Over time the members of the class
will develop the ability to protect their own interests in the legislative
process, and the need for extraordinary judicial protection will then
disappear.
Even if alienage were not considered a suspect classification,
strict scrutiny would still be the appropriate standard for reviewing
state laws that deny aliens the right to vote. "The constitutional
underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process
can no longer be doubted even though . . . 'the right to vote in
state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned.' " 50 The protected
position of the right to vote is based on a recognition that "[n]o right
58. I am starting from the premise that alienage is a suspect classification and
for that reason am assuming that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for review
of a statute denying aliens the vote. It might be thought, however, that the problem
should be approached from another direction. That is, if one were to ask first
whether aliens should be allowed to vote, and then, assuming the answer was in
the negative, to ask whether alienage should therefore be considered a suspect classification, it might seem possible to avoid strict scrutiny in reviewing the decision to
deny them the vote. Under this view it is precisely the denial of the vote to aliens,
for which the state presumably has a rational basis, that makes alienage a suspect
classification and makes strict scrutiny analysis necessary in reviewing all subsequently imposed disabilities. See Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 580
& n.30, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 & n.30, 456 P.2d 645, 654 & n.30 (1969); cf. United
States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
998 (1972). But asking the questions in this order will not, in fact, eliminate the
need for strict scrutiny in reviewing the denial of the vote. As I hope to show
in a moment, the very fact that the state is attempting to enforce an absolute denial
of the right to vote should itself be reason ,enough for strict scrutiny, whether or
not the target group is specially protected under the suspect classification banner.
Besides, the denial of the vote to aliens is not the only factor accounting for their
relative powerlessness, and lack of political power is not the only argument that
could be offered in support of the conclusion that alienage is a suspect classification.
The classification might well be suspect, in other words, even if aliens had the right
to vote. On that understanding, the denial of the vote can be upheld only if justified
under the standards of strict scrutiny.
59. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74 (1973)
(quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 ( 1966) ).
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is more precious in a free country" than the right to vote, 60 since
voting is "preservative of all rights." 61 To withhold the right to vote
is to withhold the political power that would enable persons and
groups to protect themselves in the legislative forum. The presumption of constitutionality, which rests on the "assumption that the institutions of state government are structured so as to represent fairly
all the people," 62 cannot operate where the state denies some persons the vote, any more than it can operate where a state draws lines
on the basis of a suspect classification. The citizenship qualification
is not simply a means of diluting the votes of certain persons, 63 nor
does it merely make it more difficult for certain persons to cast their
ballots. 64 It is a means of totally excluding from the political process
an identifiable segment of the population, 65 and as such it must be
justified in terms of a compelling state interest. 66
To be sure, many of the formulations of the right to vote speak
expressly in terms of a right of citizens to participate on an equal
basis with other citizens. 67 But since the cases have all involved
60. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
61. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
62. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
63. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("the right of suffrage can
be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote").
64. Compare O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974), with McDonald v. Board
of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
65. Cf. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 765-69 (1973); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969).
66. In Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 295 (1975), the Court described Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), as holding that it is only qualifications on the right to vote other than those based on age, residence, or citizenship
that must be justified in terms of a compelling state interest. But Kramer plainly
did not hold that a citizenship qualification could be upheld under a lesser standard
of review, since citizenship was not at issue in Kramer any more than it was in
Hill. The opinion in Hill does not, in any case, offer any reason for testing a
citizenship qualification under a different standard. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist
pointed out that the Court had divided all voter qualifications into two categories:
residence, age, and citizenship on the one hand, and all others on the other. He
added that "this judicially created classification would itself scarcely survive a 'rational basis test,' unexplained as it is by any of our decisions." 421 U.S. at 306.
67. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
565 (1964). It is also true that the three constitutional amendments dealing directly
with the qualifications of voters-the fifteenth (race), nineteenth (sex), and twentysixth (age)-all refer to the voting rights of citizens, as opposed to persons. But
the language of these amendments is without significance to the present inquiry. The
latter two amendments speak in terms of citizenship because they deliberately track
the verbal formula of the fifteenth amendment: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on• account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." And the amendments do not, in any case, purport
to declare who will be the eligible electors, but only to rule out the use of certain
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citizens, the references to the rights of citizens do not represent a
holding that the right is one of citizens alone. Besides, many of the
cases speak of the right as one of persons, not citizens. 08 The references to citizenship should be taken, in my view, as rhetorical
flourish. An impassioned declaration of the right of persons to vote
does not have quite the force of the same plea on behalf of citizens.
In any event, even if the references to citizens, as opposed to persons, were advertent and deliberately designed to make citizens the
exclusive beneficiaries of the right, what would be the legal or logical
basis for that limitation? The only argument I can imagine is that
voting is a right that springs from the privileges and immunities
clauses of article IV or the fourteenth amendment. If valid, that
argument would neatly dispose of the claim that it is persons, and
not just citizens, who have a right to equal treatment in the voting
process, since the clauses speak of the privileges and immunities of
citizens. The problem with the argument, of course, is that the Supreme Court has emphatically denied that voting is a right or privilege of state or national citizenship. 60 Indeed, the Court has frequently denied that there is any such thing as a "right to vote." The
references to that right are simply convenient shorthand for the right
to "participate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified
voters whenever the State has adopted an elective process. " 70 This
right to equal treatment, as the voting rights cases have clearly
acknowledged, is derived from the equal protection clause, which decriteria in deciding who will be allowed to vote. The reference to the rights of
"citizens" in the fifteenth amendment is, of course, one more indication of the general understanding during the Reconstruction period that aliens enjoyed no constitutional right to vote. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 n.13 (1973 ).
But that is a proposition I readily accept, and it is by no means fatal to the aliens'
claim so long as one accepts the view that concepts of equality do evolve. See
text at note 49 supra. Moreover, the drafters of the fifteenth amendment spoke
in terms of the rights of citizens because they were working against the background
of the Dred Scott decision, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), which had linked the
civil and political rights of blacks with the question of citizenship. Professor Bickel
has described the fourteenth amendment, with its definition of national citizenship
in § 1, as a means of exorcising Dred Scott. A. BICKEL, THE MoRALilY OF
CoNsENT 41 (1975). The wording of the fifteenth amendment serves that same
end.
68. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 97 S. Ct. 1828, 1830 (1977); Mahan v. Howell,
410 U.S. 315, 319 (1973); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,381 (1963).
69. See Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904); Minor v. Happersett, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). But compare Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 149
(1970) (separate opinion of Douglas, J.), with 400 U.S. at 213-14 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973).
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clares that no state shall deny any person the equal protection of the
laws. 71 It is precisely the distinction between citizens, who are the
beneficiaries of the privileges and immunities clause, and persons,
who enjoy the protection of the equal protection clause, that has
made possible the invalidation under the latter clause of statutes that
discriminate against aliens. 72 • If the right to equal treatment in the
electoral process owes its origin to the equal protection clause, and
it undeniably does, then whatever the dicta in earlier cases it must
be persons and not just citizens who enjoy that right. 73 That is not
to say that aliens have an unqualifiable right to vote. The equal
protection clause does not stand in the way of a state decision to
withhold the vote from aliens or any other group of persons·, provided
that the state decision can pass the rigorous test of strict scrutiny.
B.

The State Interest in Denying Aliens the Vote

On the assumption that strict scrutiny is the appropriate test for
measuring the validity of a statute denying aliens the vote, the statute
71. The only exception is Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the reapportionment case involving congressional districting. The Court found the governing
principle in neither the equal protection clause nor the privileges and immunities
clause, but rather in article I, § 2 of the Constitution, which provides that representatives shall be chosen "by the People of the several States."
72. A. BICKEL, supra note 67, at 42-48.
73. If the right to vote belongs to citizens alone, then it might be said that an
extension of the franchise to aliens would not only go beyond anything required
by the Constitution but would itself be unconstitutional. Enlarging the electorate to include persons other than citizens would water down the vote of citizens
in much the same way as malapportionment. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
208 n.88 (1970) (opinion of. Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(posing the question whether the lowering of voter qualifications unconstitutionally dilutes the votes of those meeting the higher standards). The problem with
that argument is that apportionments are now generally worked out on the basis
of census tabulations of the total population-citizens and aliens, voters and nonvoters. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746-47 (1973); cf. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92-93 (1966). Even the division of seats in Congress among
the states is based on total population, 2 U.S.C. § 2a{a) (1970), although there
has been at least one effort to exclude aliens from the base by constitutional amendment. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1946, at 1, col. 6. The citizen who lives
in a district where there are many aliens now has a vote that is greater in weight
than the vote of a citizen who lives in a district with fewer aliens. Cf. Note, Student
Voting and Apportionment: The "Rotten Boroughs' of Academia, 81 YALE L.J. 35,
47 (1971) (citizen who lives in district with many students has more voting power
than a citizen who lives in a district with fewer students). The citizen casts his
own vote and also the vote of his disenfranchised alien neighbor. The resulting
disparity in the voting strength of citizens is evidently viewed by the Supreme Court
as too trivial to require correction. But surely if a state were to correct the problem
by allowing aliens to cast their own votes, the effort could not be viewed as inconsistent with the spirit of the reapportionment decisions.
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can be upheld only if the state is able to demonstrate that it serves
a compelling state interest. Plainly, every state discerns some interest in excluding aliens from the polls, since every state does in fact
bar them from voting. But it is not enough that such statutes
"further a very substantial state interest." 74 The end must be
legitimate; the statute must be drawn with precision and tailored
carefully to serve the state's objectives; and there must be no less
drastic means of serving those objectives.
It is important to keep in mind certain characteristics of the aliens
whose right to vote is at issue. My concern is the right to vote of
resident aliens. I have no quarrel with a state's conclusion that nonresident aliens should be excluded from the polls. For this purpose
the term nonresident has significance under both state and federal
law. It is clear that only aliens domiciled in the state-residents as
a matter of state law-have a substantial claim to the right to vote.
If a state can exclude nonresident citizens from voting, its power to
exclude nonresident aliens is surely no less. Moreover, it is only
the resident alien, as defined by the federal immigration laws, whose
rights are at issue here. A resident alien is an immigrant admitted
to the United States for permanent residence, entitled to work and
live anywhere in the country. During the past 50 years resident
aliens have been admitted to the United States in limited numberscurrently, about 400,000 each year75-and only after passing two
careful screenings, one by an overseas consular official who issues the
immigrant visa and the other by the immigration official who inspects
the alien at the port of entry. Resident aliens are on a citizenship
track-after five years they are eligible for naturalization. Their
right to remain in the United States does not depend, however, on
their obtaining citizenship. They serve in the armed forces and were
subject to conscription under the selective service laws. 70 They
74. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
75. By contrast, the number of nonresident aliens admitted for temporary periods
each year exceeds 3 million. E. HARPER, IMMIGRATION LAws OF THE UNITED STATES
668 (3d ed. 1975).
76. See generally 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCE·
DURE § 2.49 (rev. ed. 1977). An alien who left the United States to avoid military
service would incur the penalty of perpetual exclusion from the country. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(22) (1970). In general, the United States has not conscripted nonimmigrant aliens under the selective service laws. As of January 1, 1971, federal regulations exempted most classes of nonimmigrants, including foreign students, officials of foreign governments, journalists, and exchange visitors, from the duty to
register with the selective service. See 32 C.F.R. § 1611.2(b)(l)-(11) (1971). See
also 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 453, 454 (1970); Comment, The Status of Aliens Under
United States Draft Laws, 13 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 501 (1972).
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pay taxes precisely like citizens of the United States. They enjoy
no immunity from state or federal criminal law. Resident aliens
enter the United States with the intention of making this country
their home, and it appears that the great majority of them remain
here indefinitely. Nonresident aliens, by contrast, are admitted to
the United States for strictly limited periods of time that are determined before they enter the United States. Included in the category
of nonresident aliens are officials of foreign governments, temporary
visitors for business or pleasure, foreign students, temporary workers
and trainees, foreign journalists, and many others who are neither
expected nor permitted to remain in this country indefinitely.
What is the basis, then, for the state's determination that resident
aliens should not share the franchise with resident citizens? The
states are said to have broad power to preserve "the basic conception
of a political community," 77 and one might suppose that aliens-by
• definition, strangers or outsiders-need not be defined as included
within the community, any more than residents of another state or
minor children need be so included. The validity of that conclusion
may seem obvious, but the articulation of the reasoning underlying
it is no easy task.
The denial of the vote to aliens might be thought to rest on a
finding that aliens, even resident aliens, have a lesser stake than
citizens in national, state, and local issues. Differences in the st~ke
that potential voters have in the outcome of elections can apparently
be taken into account by a state in deciding who will be allowed to
vote and who will not, 78 provided that there is a "genuine difference
in the relevant interests of the groups that the state electoral classification has created." 79 In Kramer v. Union Free School District, 80
the Supreme Court struck down a statute limiting the right to vote
in school district elections to those who owned or leased real property
in the district or were parents of children enrolled in the public
schools. The Court concluded that the statute did not accomplish
with sufficient precision its goal of limiting the political community
to those directly affected by school affairs. The statute's classifica77. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972). See Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
78. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719 (1973).
79. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 97 S. Ct. 1047, 1053
(1977).
80. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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tion included as voters many persons "who have, at best, a remote
and indirect interest in school affairs," while at the same time it excluded others "who have a distinct and direct interest in the school
meeting decisions." 81 As a test of stake in the decisions of government, a classification based on alienage is far more imprecise than
the classification held invalid in Kramer. Resident aliens drive on
the same highways as citizens, pay the same taxes, breathe the same
air, require the same police and fire protection, and send their children to the same schools. To deny them the right to vote is, in the
language of Kramer, to leave them without "any effective voice in
the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives." 82
I should make clear, however, that· the case for alien suffrage
does not rest on the proposition that every person affected by government policy must have a voice in its formulation. Kramer v.
Union Free School District does not establish that proposition, and
its ramifications, if true, would be very great. The decisions of a
city council, for example, may have a direct impact on a great many
persons who now have no right to vote for the members of the
council: transients, residents of neighboring communities, children,
and others besides resident aliens. Yet the resident aliens' claim
need not stand or fall with the claims of these other groups, as I
hope to make clear by briefly contrasting the position of the resident
aliens with that of these other groups.
The transient's interest, though often substantial, is distinguishable from that of the resident, whether citizen or alien, because the
transient will predictably have a different view of short-run benefits
and long-run costs than will persons who intend to reside in the community indefinitely. Drawing lines on the basis of that distinction
is difficult, and the courts have recognized the potential for abuse
where the label of transiency is casually applied. They have viewed
with increasing skepticism state claims that particular segments of the
population, students for example, are just passing through and lack a
sufficient stake in the community to deserve the vote. 83 In the case of
resident aliens (as opposed to nonresident aliens), there can be no
doubt that the transient label is inappropriate. Resident aliens have
the same stake as citizens in the long-range welfare of the communi81. 395 U.S. at 632.
82. 395 U.S. at 627. Sec Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706
(1969).
83. See Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
934 (1974); Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Newburgcr
v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972).
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ties in which they live. They may, to be sure, move from one ~ommunity to another, and some will return to their country of origin.
But citizens also move, and I know of no reason to believe that resi-·
dent aliens have a higher rate of mobility than other persoris. Like·
citizens (and unlike nonresident aliens), their right to remain in their
communities is unlimited by any state or federal law. They are not
subject to removal at the caprice of government officials. They can be
deported, of course, but only by action of the federal government
and only under exceptional circumstances. If the resident alien is
a transient because of the possibility of deportation, then citizens
should also be considered transients because of the possibility of removal to prison upon conviction of a crime.
In contrast to resident aliens, who settle in communities of their
choice and depart only when they prefer to live elsewhere, soldiers
have relatively little control over the places in which they live.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that
soldiers can be denied the vote on the theory that they lack a sufficient
commitment to the future of the communities in which they are
stationed. If soldiers reside in a state with an intention to make it
their home, "they, as all other qualified residents, have a right to an
equal opportunity for political representation." 84 The alien who has
established bona fide residence in the community is surely no more a
transient than the soldier. 85
Just as transients may be excluded from the definition of the
political community, residents of neighboring communities may be,
and routinely are, excluded as well. Yet the ramifications of a governmental decision cannot always be confined within geographic
boundaries, and nonresidents will often find themselves affected by
decisions in which they did not participate. It may be impossible,
moreover, to dismiss their interests, like those of transients, as
ephemeral. A decision to construct an airport or shopping center
in one corner of a city may have a direct, substantial, and long-range
impact on the interests of persons who live near the site but outside
the city limits and who have no role in the election ·of the. public
officials who make the decision. Still, the geographic line--for· all
its arbitrariness-is far more easily defended than a line drawn on
the basis of citizenship. The nonresident will only occasionally feel
the impact of decisions made in adjacent cities, and the physical
84. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
85. Cf. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (residents of federal enclave
entitled to vote in state elections).
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separation will often attenuate the impact, where there is any at all.
The same line that divides the community of possible voters also
divides the community of possible taxpayers. Nonresidents do not
participate directly in the decision, but by the same token they do
not pay the taxes that finance the programs approved. Resident
aliens, by contrast, pay taxes along with other residents of the community, and they lack the protection from the impact of decision that
distance affords the nonresident. Moreover, the drawing of an arbitrary geographic line can be justified in large part by the need to
draw a line somewhere. 86 The governmental action of a community
can affect not only persons who live immediately outside its borders,
but also on occasion those who live a few hundred or even a few
thousand miles away. If the right to vote must be extended to every
person touched by these effects, there may be no stopping point short
of what would be quite literally universal suffrage.
The same line drawing problem does not exist with respect to
resident aliens. The logic of allowing them to vote does not require
the extension of the vote to limitless numbers of persons who live
far from the epicenter of the decision and who may have only the
slightest and most theoretical interest in local affairs. And unlike
nonresidents, aliens have no place to turn for representation of their
views. Nonresidents have influence in their own communities, and
they may be able to persuade their elected representatives to convey
their views to the decisionmakers on the other side of the geographic
line. They also participate in the election of representatives to
higher levels of government-county, state, and national-that may
have power to grant relief. Aliens, on the other hand, can look only
to their countries of origin, and they are unlikely to find any substantial help in that direction. As nonresidents of their own countries they probably have no vote or political influence there either.
And the very fact that they have emigrated to the United States may
produce an attitude of nonchalance, or worse, on the part of government officials in the countries they have left. Besides, the issues
on which they need representation will often have no significance in
their countries of origin. It is not so much their interest as aliens
that needs protection, but their interest as parents, homeowners, taxpayers, draftees, and consumers. The governments of the countries
they have left behind are unlikely to see any benefit for themselves
86. See Note, The Right To Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88 HARV, L. REV,
1571, 1577-78 (1975).
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in representing these interests, and the likelihood that such representation would prove effective in any case is obviously very small.
A third group routinely denied the vote is children, and they undoubtedly can have the same direct long-range interest in the welfare of their communities as resident aliens. The exclusion of children from the franchise is itself a subject of much controversy, however, and the concern about the exclusion has constitutional dimensions. 87 Moreover, children do not bear all of the obligations (taxpaying, military service, and the rest) that are imposed on the adult
residents, whether citizen or alien, of the community. Indeed, the
principal argument for lowering the voting age to eighteen was that
this age marks the assumption of these obligations more accurately
than the age of twenty-one. And even though children have no formal voice in the making of government decisions that may affect
them, their parents do have such a voice and presumably will undertake much of the responsibility for representing the interests of their
children. The resident alien has no comparable representative.
The denial to aliens of the right to vote cannot be justified on
the theory that aliens as a class lack the necessary stake or interest
in governmental affairs. A possible alternative rationale is that
aliens have qualities that interfere with their ability to vote intelligently or responsibly. At least four different claims seem possiblethat aliens will become involved in vote fraud, that aliens will vote
as a bloc and tip the political balance in favor of positions they support, that aliens lack the knowledge of national and local affairs that
is needed to cast an intelligent vote, and that aliens cannot be trusted
with the vote because they lack loyalty to the United States and its
political and social institutions.

l.

Vote Fraud

The first of these arguments can be dismissed quickly. Although
the state interest in preventing vote fraud is doubtless compelling, 88
there is no reason whatsoever to believe that aliens are more likely
than citizens to lie about their residence, sell their votes, or stuff
ballot boxes. In any case, the primary responsibility for preventing
fraud at the polls does and should rest on the statutes that impose
87. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 240 (1970) (opinion of Brennan,
White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345 (1972).
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criminal penalties for such fraud. 611 Surely these statutes need be
no less effective against aliens than they are against citizens.

2.

Bloc Voting

The second possible claim is that aliens should be excluded from
the polls because they are likely to vote as a bloc. If the vice of
bloc voting is that it will substantially compound the harm of having
aliens cast their votes without sufficient knowledge of the issues and
adequate loyalty to the institutions of the United States, its seriousness depends on the validity of the assumption that aliens would, in
fact, lack the necessary knowledge and loyalty. The validity of that
assumption is a question to which I will turn in a moment. But what
of the argument that bloc voting is harmful in itself-that it is a vice
to be avoided even on the assumption that aliens would have the
intelligence and loyalty required to vote responsibly? Although it
may seem unlikely that any state would exclude aliens from the polls
in reliance on such an argument, I suspect that it is one of the most
plausible explanations for the unwillingness to grant aliens the vote.
In terms of social and economic position, aliens may be less diverse
than the population as a whole. 00 And their common experience
of giving up a homeland in another country, migrating to the United
States, and learning to cope with life here may tend to produce a
considerable similarity of viewpoint on important public issues. To
a legislator who is trying to decide whether aliens should be allowed
to vote; the argument that they lack knowledge and loyalty is likely
to be much less impressive than the argument that they are likely
to vote in unison in support of positions that he opposes. To take an
obvious example, in the controversy over alien suffrage before the Civil
War, the aliens' attitude toward slavery was an important factor. One
historian has pointed out that "[n]o matter how ignorant and stupid
89. See 405 U.S. at 353-54.
90. Historically aliens as a class have probably been less skilled and less educated than the population as a whole. But given the stringent immigration qualifications now in effect, a high percentage of new immigrants are very highly skilled.
A system of immigration preferences was established for the Eastern Hemisphere in
1965, Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101, 1151 et seq. (1970)). As a result of the emphasis on skills in the occupational categories, Eastern Hemisphere immigrants are "much more likely to be highly
trained or professional workers than are immigrants from any other area." Abrams
& Abrams, Immigration Policy~Who Gets In and Why?, 38 THE Pua. INTEREST
3, 17 (1975). The system of priorities has now been carried over to the Western
Hemisphere, and more Western Hemisphere immigrants will be subject to the labor
certification requirements. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976). Thus, the overall level of skills
should rise.
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the immigrant might be, he was more than likely to be sure of one
thing-that he did not believe in holding slaves. He could not discuss states' rights, theories of sovereignty, and nullification, but he
was unequivocally opposed to the slaveholder." 01 It was surely no
accident that none of the Southern states extended the franchise to
aliens before the Civil War, whereas alien declarants were specifically allowed to vote under the Reconstruction constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas.
The fear that aliens will vote as a bloc and that bloc voting will
prove harmful in itself cannot provide an adequate basis for the disenfranchisement of aliens. Even if there were evidence that aliens
would vote as a bloc, the goal of stifling bloc voting would be illegitimate. The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that the states
are barred from " '[f]encing out' from the franchise a sector of the
population because of the way they may vote." 02 It may be true
that aliens are much more likely than citizens to favor, for example,
high tariffs or low taxes or increased aid for urban areas, but the
desire to forestall the concentrated expression of these views is not
a constitutionally permissible reason for denying aliens the right to
vote.
3.

Lack of Knowledge Needed To Vote Intelligently

The claim that aliens lack the knowledge to vote intelligently is
plainly more difficult. The interest in insuring the knowledgeability
of voters is apparently legitimate, 93 at least so long as the state does
not attempt to limit the franchise to those who have an understanding
of the "local viewpoint." 04 But to uphold a voter qualification rule
on the basis of this interest, the state must demonstrate that its classification is carefully tailored to the objective. It may well be true
that immigrants who have arrived recently in the United States will
know little about this country's institutions of government or about
the issues on which election campaigns are fought. As a general
proposition, long-time residents of a community are always likely to
91. K. PoRTER, supra note 12, at 130. Cf. F. FRANKLIN, supra note 28, at 47
(discussing opposition to passage of Naturalization Act of 1790 on grounds that
aliens opposed to slavery would be admitted).
92. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965). See also, e.g., Cipriano v. City
of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969).
93. Cf. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)
(literacy test not invalid on its face).
94. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 355 (1972).
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be more knowledgeable about local affairs than newcomers. This
difference in relative understanding of local issues makes rational a
durational residence requirement for voting. But rationality is not
enough in the sensitive area of voting rights, as the Supreme Court
made clear in striking down such requirements in Dunn v. Blumstein. 95 A classification in terms of length of residence is simultaneously under- and over-inclusive. It excludes some newcomers who
are as knowledgeable about local affairs as long-time residents, and
it includes some long-time residents who are as ignorant of local affairs as newcomers. As expensive as it may be to separate the
knowledgeable newcomers from the unknowledgeable, the state cannot constitutionally withhold the right to vote from all new residents
in the service of some "remote administrative benefit." 96
The citizenship qualification for voting is undeniably a form of
durational residence requirement. And it is a requirement of exceptional severity, since immigrants are ordinarily ineligible for
citizenship until they have resided in the United States for five years.
To be sure, the citizen who takes up residence in a new state immediately before an election, and who is therefore the beneficiary of
the Dunn ruling, is in a somewhat different position from the alien,
who is a new resident of the country as well as of the state. Nevertheless, the analogy between the durational residence requirement
struck down in Dunn and the denial of the vote to aliens is close
enough to raise considerable doubt about the effort to sustain that
denial on the argument that alien newcomers lack the knowledge
required of good voters.
Dunn upheld the right of new residents to vote in state and local
elections as well as elections for national offices. It is not at all clear
that a New Yorker who moves to Texas and votes in a local election
soon after arrival will be any more knowledgeable about local issues
than a citizen of France who moves to the United States and takes
up residence in Texas. The knowledge will be acquired if there
is a reason for acquiring it and if the opportunity to acquire it is at
hand. With regard to the reason for gaining the knowledge, one
cannot distinguish the alien newcomer from the citizen newcomer.
They both have a stake in the outcome of local elections. They both
pay taxes and send their children to the public schools. If an issue
arises that concerns the level of taxation in the community or the
95. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).

96. 405 U.S. at 351 (quoting Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965)).
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quality of the schools, the alien newcomer is no more likely to view
the issue with indifference than is the citizen newcomer. But perhaps the difference between the two is in the ability and opportunity
to gain the necessary information, as opposed to the desire to obtain
it. Dunn implicitly recognizes that a very substantial part of voter
education takes place in the days immediately preceding an election.
And the principal educators are the candidates for public office and
their supporters. The candidates will make an effort to reach out
to potential voters to explain their positions, not because of any commitment to voter education in the abstract, but because they want
their votes. If aliens have votes to offer, the candidates will come
to them. The contest for their votes will inevitably produce a substantial amount of political education and instruction on the issues.
Of course, the state's fear may be that alien newcomers will lack
the knowledge of local issues that is necessary to appreciate the
subtleties of the debate. And they may miss the debate entirely if
they cannot understand the English language. But again the classification is grossly over-inclusive. The great majority of aliens are
literate in some language, if not English, since literacy has been a
prerequisite to admission for almost all immigrants since Congress imposed the requirement97 over President Wilson's veto in 1917. Besides, a substantial amount of voter education already takes place in
languages other than English. 98 The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975,99 which suspend the use of literacy tests and devices
that can effectively disenfranchise members of a language minority,100 rest on the premise that there is no necessary correlation between intelligent voting and the ability to speak or read the English
language.
Moreover, it is hardly the case that all or even most resident
aliens are unable to speak English. In addition to the immigrants
who were raised in English-language countries or educated in
English-language schools, there are a great many aliens who have
97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(25) (1970). The literacy qualification applies to
most prospective immigrants who are at least 16 years of age and physically capable
of reading. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b) (1970).
·
98. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-55 & n.15 (1966); Cardona
v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 675-76 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Puerto Rican Organization for Political Action v. Kusper, 350 'F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Ill. 1972), affd.,
490 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1973).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
100. For a list of the states and counties covered by the minority language provisions of the Voting Rights Act, see U.S. CoMMN. ON ClvIL RIGHTS, USING THE
VonNG RIGHTS Acr 16-20 (1976).
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learned English since their arrival in the United States. 101 The great
majority of aliens have lived in the United States for years, and they
are likely to have gained some understanding of English and some
familiarity with American political processes during their residence
here. The citizenship requirement for voting assumes that it will
take at least five years of residence to gain the understanding needed
to vote intelligently in an American election. Whether or not that
was true of all aliens a century ago, when television and other modern sources of information were not available and a rather high proportion of new immigrants was illiterate,102 it is certainly not true
for all aliens today. A great many will have gained whatever understanding is necessary long before the five years have elapsed.
But what if the knowledge a state expects its voters to have is
not the sort that can be acquired in the period immediately preceding an election, even by a person who speaks English well and is
anxious to learn? Perhaps the state is looking for a subtler kind of
knowledge-for example, an understanding of the history of the
United States, and in particular an ability to see the issues of the
day in their historical context; an appreciation of the role of political institutions, especially political parties; and an ability to look behind ideological debate in order to discern the real clash of interests
that underlies it. To return to the example of the immigrant who
opposed slavery but knew nothing of nullification or theories of sovereignty, it may be that the state's goal is precisely to insure that
voters will cast their ballots on the basis of some understanding of
concepts like nullification and state sovereignty. A substantial number of aliens may, in fact, lack that kind of understanding even after
years of residence in the United States. But few citizens have that
kind of knowledge either. The classification, in other words, is seriously under-inclusive. Naturalization is not predicated on a demonstration of this kind of knowledge, and the naturalized citizen is not
presumptively more likely to have it than the unnaturalized alien.
Nor could very many native-born citizens meet this exacting standard. It seems unlikely, therefore, that this standard is what the state
has in mind when it bars aliens from voting. And if it is, the classifi101. The number of permanent resident aliens in the country as of January 1975
has been estimated at 4,255,725. Of these, 325,410 were nationals of Canada and
289,674 of Great Britain. [1975] INS ANN. REP. 21. Another 868,198 were
nationals of Mexico, id., and many of them live in areas where Spanish is almost
an official second language. Cf. Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723, 731 (D.D.C.
1972).
102. See U.S. IMMIGRATION CoMMN., .ABSTRACI' OF REPORTS, s. Doc. No.
747, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 98-100 (1911) (Dillingham Commission Report).
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cation is simply not tailored to fit the objective with anything like
the kind of precision that the strict scrutiny standard demands.
The classification produces two types of mistakes: it allows some
uninformed persons to vote, and it prevents some well-informed persons from voting. Since we deny the vote to all aliens, the only mistake we can make with regard to this group is that of excluding a
well-informed person from the polls. If the proportion of aliens who
are well informed is greater than one-half, the classification is completely irrational, for it produces a greater number of mistakes than
would result from adopting the opposite rule and allowing all aliens
to vote. (I am assuming that withholding the vote from an informed
person is considered at least as serious a mistake as offering the vote
to an uninformed person.) But even assuming that the proportion
of aliens who can meet the knowledge standard, however lenient it
may be, is less than one-half, one still ought to determine the
proportion of citizens that has the necessary knowledge. The proportion with the necessary knowledge may be no greater than the
counterpart proportion of aliens. If so, one can reasonably ask why
aliens are singled out for special treatment. And if fewer than one•
half of all citizens have the knowledge we are after, we could reduce the overall number of mistakes by changing our rule for
citizens and excluding them all from the polls. It may seem preposterous to eliminate all elections, but the only alternative would be
to concede that knowledgeability is not really the quality upon which
we are insisting.
Yet even if one makes the fairly generous assumption that, say,
75% of all citizens have the necessary knowledge, whereas only
20 % of all resident aliens could meet the standard, it would seem
essential, considering that the standard of review is strict scrutiny,
to go on and consider the relative size of the two populations. There
are approximately 4 million resident aliens in the United States, and
of these slightly more than 3 million are of voting age. About 80
million citizens voted in the 1976 presidential election. Assuming
that 20% of the aliens are well enough informed to vote intelligently, we make 600,000 mistakes by excluding each of the 3 million adult aliens from the polls. If we allowed all 3 million to vote,
the number of mistakes would jump to 2.4 million (assuming that
all would actually vote), since 80% of the aliens are presumed to
be uninformed. The net increase in the number of mistakes would
be 1.8 million. It is important to note, however, that we are already
admitting to the polls a large number of uninformed voters. On the
assumption that 25 % of all citizens lack the necessary knowledge,
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the number of uninformed voters for the 197 6 presidential election
would be approximately 20 million.
I do not mean to adopt a cavalier attitude toward the addition
of 2.4 million uninformed aliens to the voter rolls. Even one vote
can decide an election, and 2.4 million votes would provide a healthy
margin of victory in some presidential contests. But putting that
number alongside the 20 million mistakes that I am assuming we
already tolerate, one gets a better sense of the potential costs of allowing all aliens to vote. If we can live with 20 million uninformed
voters, it is not altogether clear how one could demonstrate a compelling interest in preventing another 2.4 million uninformed persons
from going to the polls. Allowing aliens to vote, even on the very
generous assumption that few aliens have the necessary knowledge
whereas almost all citizens do, would increase the proportion of uninformed votes among the total number cast from 25% to 27% .103
I have no doubt that it would be rational to minimize the total number of mistakes by excluding all aliens. But what the state must
show is need, not just rationality. And assuming that some 20
million uninformed citizens are already going to the polls, there is
substantial reason to doubt that the real purpose of the disqualification of aliens is, in fact, to deny the vote to the uninformed.
I have argued in the preceding paragraphs that it is better to
admit all aliens to the polls than to exclude them all, even assuming
that a large majority lack the knowledge to cast an intelligent vote.
It may seem that I have made the case for alien suffrage needlessly
difficult. After all, the strict scrutiny standard prohibits a state from
treating every member of a group alike when a less restrictive means
could be used to achieve the same objective. If the state's real goal
is to allow only knowledgeable persons to vote, should it not be re103. Of course, resident aliens are heavily concentrated in some areas of the
country, and the impact of allowing them to vote would therefore be greater in some
areas than others. But it remains true even in those states with the greatest number
of resident aliens that extending the vote to all aliens would produce at worst only
a small marginal increase in the number of uninformed voters. Just under onehalf of all the resident aliens live in three states-California, New York, and Texas,
INS ANN. REP., supra note 101, at 21-so the total number of voting age aliens in
these three states should be approximately 1.5 million. The citizens of these three
states cast a total of almost 18 million votes in the 1976 presidential election. BuREAU OF TIIE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1976, at 455,
On the continued assumption that 20% of all resident aliens have the knowledge required to vote intelligently while 75% of all citiz.ens can meet that standard, the
effect of allowing aliens to vote would be to increase the number of uninformed
votes cast in these three states (assuming that all aliens of voting age would vote)
from 4.5 million to 5.7 million. The proportion of uninformed votes cast in tliese
three states would thus increase from 25% to just under 32%.
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quired to make some effort to screen out those who lack the necessary qualification and allow the qualified to vote? I have no trouble
with the suggestion that it would be too expensive or too administratively inconvenient to do the required screening, since in the context
of strict scrutiny these concerns are traditionally thought insufficient
to justify the rejection of a less restrictive means in favor of a more
sweeping rule. The real problem is that the obvious screening devices-literacy tests, American government and history tests, tests
of comprehension of spoken English-all raise serious difficulties of
their own. They tend to place in the hands of election examiners
a measure of discretion that produces a grave risk of discrimination
on the basis of race, national origin, or political viewpoint. The suspension of all sorts of voter qualification tests in the 1975 Voting
Rights Act Amendments is a good indication of the federal government's concern about this possibility of abuse.
It may at first seem paradoxical to deny the vote to all aliens
in order to avoid the need for a system of tests that might result in
the invidious denial of the vote to some number less than all. But
two reasons could be offered in support of a state's preference for
a total ban. First, it is not just the possibility of error that makes
the testing process so unattractive. The spectacle of having state
officials determine what is the "correct" view of American history
or the "correct" view of the role of political parties is troubling in
itself. Thus, even if the sorting out of aliens could be guaranteed
error-free, the creation of the elaborate testing system needed to accomplish this result could be thought more worrisome than the mistakes we now make by excluding from the polls some number of
aliens who are as well informed as citizens. Second, the decision
to test aliens for knowledge of public affairs could require the testing
of citizens as well. The need for testing aliens is much greater, of
course, since we are assuming that a much higher percentage of
aliens than citizens is uninformed. But the imposition on aliens
of a requirement that they prove themselves informed while citizens
are automatically assumed to be sufficiently informed would raise
many of the same equal protection problems as the total exclusion
of aliens. 104 And the appalling potential for abuse implicit in a decision to provide knowledge tests for 80 million citizen voters could
well be enough to destroy the argument that case-by-case screening
of aliens is a less restrictive means of achieving the state's objective
than banning them altogether.
104. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute that granted benefits to all spouses of male members of
the armed forces but to spouses of female members only on proof of dependency).
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It may be possible, however, to find some device for sorting out
aliens according to knowledge that would reduce somewhat the number of mistakes without at the same time creating the potential for
abuse of a knowledge or literacy test. One possible candidate is a
durational residence requirement for aliens that would be long
enough to insure some experience with life in the United States,
though still substantially shorter than the five years required for naturalization. The point is not to draw a new line only marginally different from the one that now exists. The citizenship qualification
is more than just a durational residence requirement. Many aliens
who have lived in the United States for years are nevertheless unable
to vote because they have not taken advantage of the opportunity
for naturalization. If lack of knowledge is what disqualifies the alien
from voting and if it is long-term residence in the United States that
gives the alien the necessary knowledge, why is it that we refuse
to extend the vote to all immigrants who have lived here for at least
five years, whether or not they have gone ahead and been naturalized?
To explain our refusal to take that step in terms of the supposed
concern about the knowledgeability of aliens, one has to believe that
naturalization itself has value as a measure of the immigrant's understanding of American political issues. I am not persuaded that
naturalization has any such value. True, aliens who seek naturalization are expected to study the American political system, and they
are tested on their understanding of it. But the test demands
nothing more than a rudimentary level of understanding-a level
that has undoubtedly been achieved by a great many unnaturalized
aliens who have lived in this country for five years or more. 100
These aliens remain unnaturalized not because they are unwilling
to learn about American government or unable to pass the test, but
rather, it would appear, because they are reluctant to take the required oath of renunciation106 and give up the citizenship they
presently hold. Their reluctance to take the oath may speak badly
105. The knowledge test requires the petitioner for naturalization to answer five
or six questions such as, "What document declared the 13 colonies to be free and
independent States?"; "On what day do we celebrate our Nation's birthday?"; "Who
is the President now?"; "Who discovered America?". The questions are reported
in J. WASSERMAN, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PRACTICE 487-88 (2d ed. 1973). In fiscal
year 1975, 141,537 petitions for naturalization were granted and 2,300 were denied.
The number denied for lack of understanding of American history and principles
of government was 14. INS ANN. REP., supra note 101, at 130, 134.
106. 8 u.s.c. § 1448 (1970).

Aliens and the Right To Vote

April-May 1977]

1125

for their loyalty to the United States, and in that sense it may be
a sufficient reason to deny them the vote. But putting the loyalty
question aside for a moment, the fact remains that one cannot completely explain the ban on alien voting in terms of the need for
knowledge of American political issues. To the extent that a lack
of knowledge is the state's real concern, a simple durational residency requirement would do a more precise job of sorting aliens than
the naturalization requirement, and it would still avoid the potential
abuse of testing for English literacy, knowledge of local affairs, and
the like.
4.

Disloyalty

The claim that' aliens lack the loyalty required to vote responsibly, like the claim that they lack the knowledge to vote intelligently,
is not inherently implausible. But it is important to make clear exactly what is meant by disloyalty. The state may fear that some
aliens would use the opportunity to vote as a means of accomplishing
goals that are disloyal in the broadest sense-disruption, subversion,
and ultimately destruction of the state. I have no doubt that the
interest in preventing that kind of disloyalty is compelling under any
standard. But that interest cannot explain the denial of the vote
to aliens, since there is no reason to believe that aliens would engage
in such acts, or, at any rate, would engage in such acts any more frequently than citizens. The conclusion that there is inadequate nexus
between the alleged end and the means chosen seems to me so obvious that I very much doubt the means could be upheld on this
theory even under a rational basis test.
Aliens who seek admission to the United States are subject to
very careful screening, and they cannot gain admission if a consular
officer or the Attorney General "knows or has reasonable ground to
believe [that they] probably would, after entry . . . engage in activities that would be prohibited by the law of the United States
relating to espionage, sabotage, public disorder, or in other activity
subversive to the national security . . . ." 107 Specifically declared
ineligible for admission are aliens who are, or at any time have been,
anarchists, communists, or persons who advocate or teach the overthrow by force of the government of the United States.108 An alien
who has managed to gain entry into the United States is subject, to
107. 8 U.S.C.
108. 8 U.S.C.

§
§

1182(a)(29) (1970).
1182(a)(28) (1970).
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the same extent as any citizen, to the laws relating to espionage,
sabotage, public disorder, and the rest. And the resident alien can
even be prosecuted for treason-the crime against allegiance-since
he owes at least a temporary allegiance while present in the United
States and is no freer than a citizen to give aid and comfort to the
country's enemies. 109 Moreover, a resident alien who is an anarchist, a communist, an advocate of sabotage or destruction of private
property, or any one of a great many other things, can be removed
from the country altogether by deportation. 110
It is not entirely clear, of course, that the deportation and exclusion rules will accomplish their objective and keep the United States
free from aliens committed to subversion, sabotage, and disruption.
And the spies, saboteurs, and assorted ne'er-do-wells who might
manage to slip into the country in spite of the best efforts of consular and immigration personnel could probably do more mischief
if allowed to vote than they are now able to accomplish without the
right to vote. But given the nature of an election, it could not
be very much more. And what about the citizens who advocate or
teach subversion, who are anarchists, or who are committed to the
destruction of private property? They are not subject to any screening at all, and yet they are all allowed to vote. Most citizens were,
of course, born in this country and educated here (naturalized
citizens and persons born to American parents overseas being the
principal exceptions), but birth and education cannot guarantee that
a person will never believe in anarchy, violence, or revolution.
Given the screening and threat of deportation to which aliens are
subject and citizens are not, a state cannot rationally conclude that
aliens as a class are more likely than citizens to use the ballot to subvert national security.
Putting aside the question of disloyalty in the sense of subversion,
there remains a very troublesome problem in connection with the
loyalty of aliens. In its subtlest form the claim that aliens lack the
loyalty to vote responsibly is intertwined with the claim that aliens
109. The crime of treason, as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1970), is applicable
not only to citizens, but to anyone "owing allegiance to the United States" who
commits any of the proscribed acts. On the vulnerability of aliens to prosecution
for treason, at least for treasonous acts committed in the United States, see Powers,
Treason by Domiciled Aliens, 11 MIL. L. REv. 123 (1962); 17 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 283 (1949). See also F. Franklin, supra note 28, at 2 (Continental Congress
resolved that transients owed allegiance and could be prosecuted for treason); cf.
Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1948), appeal dismissed, 338
U.S. 883 (1949).
110. 8 u.s.c. § 1251 (1970).
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lack the knowledge to vote intelligently. •Immigrants who have arrived recently in the United States may know little about this country's institutions of government or about the issues on which election
campaigns are fought. They can certainly learn about these matters,
and it would not take very long for many of them to gain this
knowledge. But in all likelihood many immigrants are also largely
ignorant of this country's values and traditions and therefore cannot
have developed an appreciation of or commitment to them. The
naturalization requirement for voting could be seen as responsive to
this concern in two different ways. First, the durational residence
feature gives the immigrant an opportunity to develop a feel for
American values and traditions. Second, the act of naturalization
itself represents a formal and solemn commitment to the country,
its values, and its institutions. The testing of a prospective citizen's
loyalty, knowledge, and character is critical, under this view, not so
much because it screens out the undeserving candidate but rather
because it makes the attainment of naturalization difficult and meaningful. The judicial setting and the oath of renunciation and allegiance ( with its grand language about foreign princes and potentates
and bearing true faith and allegiance to the United States)111 drive
home to the new citizen the significance of the occasion. 112 It all
adds up to a very deliberate and ritualized act of opting into the community and accepting its values and traditions as one's own.
In my view, this argument is the most substantial one that can
be made in defense of the citizenship qualification for voting. And
yet it is by no means free of difficulty. If everything is going to turn
on a sense of commitment to the country's values and traditions, it
would seem important to know exactly what values and traditions,
or "societal and political mores," 113 we have in mind. There has
been a recurring tendency in this country, as Sacco, Vanzetti, and
111. 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (1977):
"I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty,
of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when
required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the armed
forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work
of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and
that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; so help me God."
112. The Immigration and Naturalization Service reports that it makes an effort
to schedule naturalization ceremonies at places of special historical significance.
INS ANN. REP., supra note 101, at 21.
113. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D. Md. 1974), affd. mem., 426
U.S. 913 (1976).
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a great many others could attest, to blame aliens for the introduction
of ideas that many citizens have found offensive. From the very
beginning the terms "alien" and "sedition" have shown a remarkable
affinity for one another. How does one go about deciding which
values are truly American and which foreign? Which traditions are
the ones that the alien must appreciate and understand-the traditions of those who were once slaves or those who were once masters;
those who won the Mexican-American War or those who lost it;
those who came from Ireland or those who despised the Irish and
would have sent them back?
The very fact that neither candidate in an election wins all the
votes is in itself a good indication that the electorate is already
divided on fundamental value questions. Political analysts typically
assume that different segments of American society-Catholics,
Chicanos, blue-collar workers, Polish-Americans-have their own
values and traditions that influence their voting behavior. To which
set of values and traditions are the aliens expected to commit themselves? Do we exclude them from the polls until they have narrowed the choice to two-the Democratic tradition and the Republican tradition-and then tum them loose to make a free choice between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson? Or is it rather
that the central value and tradition of this country is that there is
no central value and tradition? 1Perhaps aliens are entitled to hold
whatever views they want, but they cannot be allowed to vote until
they have come to understand and cherish the fact that they may
hold whatever views they want. One has an intuitive sense that an
alien who has not been socialized in the United States will lack certain characteristics or attitudes that are fundamentally American.
But given the diversity of socialization experiences available in the
United States, this intuition would seem a rather treacherous foundation on which to build an argument of compelling state interest.
Instead of trying to determine the substantive content of the
country's values and traditions, one might do better to focus on the
act of commitment to the United States that naturalization apparently
involves. In terms of values, culture, and language, resident aliens
may be indistinguishable from at least some group of American
citizens. And their loyalty may be beyond question, at least in the
sense that they think well of the country and wish it no harm. But
what may be lacking is a willingness on the part of resident aliens
to identify themselves with the country and its people and to give
up once and for all their attachment to the countries in which they
were born. The unnaturalized alien is perhaps holding something
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back, refusing to join in. Yet, although all that may be true, the
burden on the state is not to show that aliens are somehow different
from citizens, but rather to show a relationship between the difference and the state's legitimate interest in regulating the franchise.
So long as aliens are not disloyal in the larger sense of being subversive or disruptive, what harm could result from allowing them to
cast a ballot even though they may not have made a wholehearted
commitment to the United States? What exactly is it that the state
fears? Perhaps at bottom the argument is essentially symbolic.
Aliens cannot share in the administration of the social compact until
they have formally consented to be bound by its terms. Law, in this
view, "has its origins in a contract, an imagined legal transaction,"
and the concept of citizenship is what "defin[es] the parties to the
original contract and the membership of the society."114 This contractual view of the nature of the state has a long tradition, and it
was influential at the time of the founding of this country. But can
it really be possible to construct a compelling state interest out of
a metaphor concerning the origins of civil society? It was this same
metaphor, as Professor Bickel has pointed out,115 that furnished the
reasoning behind the Supreme Court's decision in the Dred Scott
case. 116 Surely we have reached the point where, if a state is to
withhold fundamental political rights by classifying persons along
lines that are inherently suspect, it must be able to point to some
concrete harm that its measure will prevent. In this context it is hard
to see what the harm could be.
Besides, it is simply not correct to say that unnaturalized aliens
have made no commitment to the United States. In contrast to
native-born citizens, whose commitment, if any, is tacit, resident
aliens have committed themselves knowingly and voluntarily. They
have all had to make considerable effort to qualify for an immigrant
visa, which is ordinarily a good deal harder to obtain than a certificate of naturalization. Even after proving themselves qualified, they
have had to wait months and even more often years for a visa to
become available. And they have given up their homes in the countries of their birth and resettled in the United States.11 7 Moreover,
114. A. BICKEL, supra note 67, at 5.
115. Id.
116. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19- How.) 393 (1857).
117. Speaking at the Constitutional Convention on the question of a durational
citizenship requirement for senators, Benjamin Franklin declared: "When foreigners
after looking about for some other country in which they can obtain more happiness,
give a preference to ours, it is a proof of attachment which ought to excite our
confidence & affection." Quoted in 4 J. MADISON, WRITINGS 148 (Hunt ed. 1903).

1130

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:1092

most resident aliens had ties to the United States even before they
arrived, for they have tended to follow their countrymen and kinsmen in chains of migration. Nearly forty per cent of those admitted
each year are close relatives of American citizens, 118 and the proportion of close relatives will increase now that Congress has finally carried over to the Western Hemisphere the system of immigration
preferences that has been applied to the Eastern Hemisphere for the
past ten years. 119 Furthermore, their children born in the United
States are citizens of this country at birth. Resident aliens are committed enough to the United States to serve in the armed forces, and
they have been drafted into the army in the same way as citizens.
A resident alien is admitted in the expectation that he will make the
United States his home and remain here indefinitely. Nothing in
state or federal law prevents him from developing a strong sentimental attachment to the United States and its people or from making
a good faith commitment of his future to this country and to the state
in which he lives. And the very act of voting in an American election would itself represent a form of commitment on the part of the
alien to the United States. 12° Finally, if the state insists that the
alien voter make an overt and solemn commitment to the United
118. Of the 386,194 permanent residents admitted in fiscal year 1975, 91,504
gained admission as immediate relatives of United States citizens. INS ANN. RBP.,
supra note 101, at 6, 36. Immediate relatives are defined as "the children, spouses,
and parents of a citizen of the United States: Provided, That in the case of parents,
such citizen must be at least twenty-one years of age." 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970).
Aliens who can qualify as immediate relatives are not subject to any numerical limitation. Of the aliens subject to numerical limitation, 160,460 entered under the system of preferences applicable to the Eastern Hemisphere. Of these, 52,868 were the
beneficiaries of preferences for adult children, spouses, brothers, and sisters of citizens (and another 43,077 entered under preferences for the spouses, sons, and daughters of resident aliens). INS ANN. REP., supra note 101, at 43. The system of prefences gives relatives priority for 74% of the available visas. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
119. Until passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976), no system of preferences applied in the
Western Hemisphere, and visas were made available according to the order in which
applications were filed. Under the system of preferences, relatives of citizens and
resident aliens will now have priority for 74% of the visas allocated to the Western
Hemisphere.
120. The point is implicitly recognized in the federal statute providing for the
expatriation of American citizens who vote in political elections in other countries.
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1970). Some years before the statute was enacted a House
committee explained its purpose in these terms: "Taking an active part in the political affairs of a foreign state by voting in a political election therein is believed
to involve a political attachment and practical allegiance thereto which is inconsistent
with continued allegiance to the United States, whether or not the person in question
has or acquires the nationality of the foreign state." Codification of the Nationality
Laws of the United States, H.R. Comm. Print, pt. 1, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 67, quoted
in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 54 (1958). The federal statute in question was
held unconstitutional in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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States, it could require as a precondition to voting the taking of an
oath of allegiance. It is "clear that one need not be a citizen in
order to take in good conscience an oath to support the Constitution."121
Moreover, why should one assume that the citizen's commitment
to the United States is in some sense different from or greater than
the alien's? The citizen's commitment presumably arises from birth
and schooling in this country and from having parents who identify
themselves as citizens. But not all citizens were born or raised in
the United States. A child born overseas to American parents is
under some circumstances a citizen of the United States at birth. 122
And a child born here may be taken to another country as an infant and raised there. Furthermore, not all native-born citizens are
raised by citizens, since the children of aliens are citizens at birth
and remain citizens whether or not their parents are ever naturalized.123 Some citizens are dual nationals-they have acquired
American citizenship by birth in this country and also the citizenship
of one or both their parents, or they have acquired American citizenship by virtue of birth overseas to an American parent and also the
citizenship of the country of their birth-and they will owe allegiance
not just to the United States but to another country as well. In all
of these cases there may be some reason to doubt the existence of
the kind of open and unreserved commfrment to the United States
and its people that citizenship is assumed to involve. Yet all of these
citizens, unlike resident aliens, are allowed to vote.
The number of these cases is small, however, and perhaps they
can be dismissed as representing a de minimis exception to an otherwise sound general principle. But there is also a much larger group
of American citizens who, though born and raised here by citizenparents, nevertheless feel a very strong sentimental attachment to a
state other than the one in which they live or to a foreign homeland
they may never have known. The Texas-born New Yorker, who
identifies himself as a Texan and who looks forward eagerly to the
day he can return to Texas, is entitled to vote in New York even
though he has not committed himself unreservedly to his adopted
state. 124 And considering the pride we now take in our ethnic
121. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 111 n.43 (1976). See also
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 726 n.18 (1973 ).
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3), (4), (7) (1970).
123. See Wong Kim Ark v. United States, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
124. Cf. Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Newburger
v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972).
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heterogeneity, no one would suggest that a citizen is less than fully
American merely because he studies the language, culture, and history of another country, visits it, dreams of retiring there someday,
or even uses his political privileges here to urge a tilt toward that
country in the foreign policy of the United States. We have come
to accept and even cherish the fact that many citizens will retain what
Justice Frankfurter called "old cultural loyalty"126 to another country, and the line between cultural matters and political matters is
known to be indistinct. The internment during the Second World
War of persons of Japanese ancestry--citizen and alien alike-is a
powerful reminder of how far we have been willing to go on the
supposition that national origin may be much more accurately predictive of loyalty than is citizenship. In short, it is hard to see what
it is about resident aliens that makes us insist on excluding them
from the polls for want of the necessary commitment to the United
States.
Yet it may be objected that the net effect of this kind of argument is to deny the existence of any distinction at all between the
citizen and the alien. If the alien is indistinguishable from the
citizen in terms of knowledge of affairs in the United States, loyalty,
and commitment to the people and institutions of the United States,
and if for that reason the alien has a constitutional right to vote, then
it may appear that the concept of citizenship has been robbed of al1
its meaning. Plainly, nothing that I have said would jeopardize the
distinction between the citizen and the nonresident alien. But one
might insist that under the view presented here resident aliens would
in effect be naturalized as of the moment they take up residence
in the United States. Much of the difficulty arises, however, from
125. The phrase was used by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Baumgartner v. United
States, 322 U.S. 665, 674 (1944), a case that involved a government attempt to
revoke naturalization. Baumgartner was a Nazi sympathizer of German birth who
"spoke so persistently about the superiority of German people, the German schools,
and the engineering work of the Germans, that he aroused antagonism among his
co-workers and was transferred to a different section" of the plant in which he
worked. 322 U.S. at 667-68. Baumgartner sent his children to Germany because
he wanted them to be educated in German schools, and he attended meetings of
organizations where the German national anthem was sung and the Nazi salute offered. And, when the Germans captured Dunkirk, he announced: "Today I am
rejoicing." 322 U.S. at 669. Yet, even in the midst of the Second World War,
the Supreme Court was unwilling to permit his denaturalization. The standard for
denaturalization is, to be sure, stricter than the standard for naturalization, and
Baumgartner might have failed to become a citizen in the first place if the record
had reflected what it later showed. But Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court
makes clear that "[f]orswearing past political allegiance without reservation and full
assumption of the obligations of American citizenship are not at all inconsistent with
cultural feelings imbedded in childhood and youth." 322 U.S. at 674.
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the assumed equation of citizenship and voting. My argument is not
that resident aliens look like citizens, so therefore they must be
citizens. It is rather that in pertinent respects resident aliens are
enough like citizens that it may be unconstitutional to distinguish between them in allocating the right to vote.
Citizens have historically enjoyed certain rights and undertaken
certain obligations that resident aliens did not share. Every time one
of those rights or obligations is passed on to aliens the gap between
citizens and aliens narrows. If we are determined to maintain a gap,
to preserve a sense of "we" and "they," we could disqualify aliens
from owning land or deny them welfare benefits or make them all
wear green hats. The imposition of these disabilities on aliens may
seem intolerable. But why should it be any more tolerable to make
the burden of preserving the distinction between citizens and aliens
fall exclusively on the right to vote, the most precious right of all?
Moreover, extending the franchise to aliens would not, in fact,
completely close the gap between citizens and aliens, since voting
is not the only distinction between the two that survives the Supreme
Court's recent decisions on the rights of aliens. By the terms of the
Constitution itself aliens are ineligible to hold certain offices in the
government of the United States. Aliens do not have the same right
as citizens to gain admission to the United States. Citizens born
abroad can take up residence in this country whenever they desire.
Citizens can abandon their residence in the United States without
fear of losing their right to return. Aliens, on the other hand, gain
the right to reside in the United States only upon compliance with
the stringent terms of the immigration laws. And resident aliens
who abandon their domicile in this country will not necessarily be
readmitted. When citizens travel outside the United States they
carry American passports, and they expect and ordinarily receive the
diplomatic protection of the United States when the need for it arises.
Aliens, even resident aliens, have no right to call upon the United
States for that protection and would not receive it in any case.
Citizens are entitled to have the government represent their interests
in international tribunals. Aliens have no such right, and under international law the government would be barred from representing
them even if it had any interest in doing so. Citizens are generally
free from any obligation to register with the government or to inform the government regularly of their whereabouts. Aliens are
subject to rather elaborate reporting requirements. Citizens can be
held to account in American courts for conduct overseas in some cir-
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cumstances where aliens apparently cannot. 12 ° Citizens can confer
an immigration preference on their relatives overseas in a considerable number of situations where aliens cannot.
It is not altogether clear that all of these distinctions between
citizens and aliens can withstand strict scrutiny. But they all involve
action of the federal government as opposed to the states, and for
that reason the applicable standard of review may be less rigorous
than strict scrutiny. 127 In any case, considering the primacy of the
right to vote one could reasonably argue that it is distinctions like
these that should bear the burden of differentiating citizens from
aliens, and not the distinction between voting and not voting. We
could, in other words, grant the right to vote to resident aliens and
still leave them readily distinguishable from citizens. Yet that result
would remain unacceptable to those who believe that allowing aliens
to vote would eviscerate the concept of citizenship. Their assumption must be that political rights are inherently and properly rights
of citizenship, whereas civil rights have no necessary connection with
citizenship and properly belong to "persons." In the earliest part
of the country's history, however, the assumption was precisely the
reverse: citizenship "carried with it civil rights but no political privileges."128 Citizenship, and in particular naturalization, was thought
important because it determined whether or not a new settler would
be able to own and convey land. 129 Even today, as I indicated
earlier, the Supreme Court insists that citizenship as such confers no
right to vote. Indeed, it would seem anomalous to equate citizenship
with voting so long as we separate the power to make persons
citizens from the power to make persons voters. The former power
inheres in the national government, the latter in the states.
Yet I cannot deny the existence of a widespread assumption that
the right to vote is not only a right of citizenship, but the quintessential right of citizenship. 130 And the conferral of the right to vote
126. Cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (citizens abroad subject
to service of subpoena).
127. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88 (1976).
128. Start, Naturalization in the English Colonies in North America, in AMER!•
CAN HISTORICAL ASSN., ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1893, at 319 (1894);
cf. F. FRANKLIN; supra note 28, at 38: "Throughout the debate [on the Naturalization Act of 1790] the principal rights involved in citizenship were regarded as landholding and office-holding. Only occasionally did suffrage as an independent right
receive notice."
129. See Start, supra note 128, at 319-20.
130. One of the principal reasons for seeking naturalization is doubtless the desire to obtain voting privileges. If aliens were allowed to vote, it is quite possible
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on aliens would undermine that assumption. But where does the
assumption come from, and why should we insist on preserving it?
Intuitively, it seems that there must be some explanation for the assumption. After all, the very fact that it is so widespread may be
an indication that it responds to some important inner need of
citizens to distinguish themselves from what are perceived to be outsiders, even where the outsiders are their neighbors. But I do not
believe that it is possible to articulate an explanation for this assumption without moving the discussion to a level of extremely high abstraction and without putting a great deal of weight on symbolic values. To sustain the disenfranchisement of aliens on the strength of
that kind of reasoning would be fundamentally inconsistent, it seems
to me, with our ordinary approach in determining which state interests are compelling. I am reluctant to conclude that, because I have
so much difficulty articulating the state's interest, it must be less than
compelling. But I am confident at least that the validity of laws denying aliens the vote is by no means self-evident. It is surely not
enough to tip one's hat at the state interest in-having knowledgeable
and loyal voters and let it go at that.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The denial to aliens of the right to vote leaves them seriously
disadvantaged. Thanks to the protection offered by the courts, the
risk to which aliens are exposed is somewhat limited. Indeed, in
some respects they may be better off with the suspectness label than
they would be with the right to vote. With political privileges they
would presumably win in the legislative forum on some issues and
lose on others. But so long as the Supreme Court protects them
from the majority, as a group they can never lose. Groups that
have political privileges-farmers, union members, downtown merchants--often lose on important issues and find themselves disadvantaged by state legislation that imposes special burdens upon them.
If giving up the right to vote would necessitate strict scrutiny of such
legislation, the groups might do better to sacrifice their political
privileges and take their chances in court. And yet I doubt that any

that fewer aliens would seek naturalization. Indeed, one of the purposes of a citizenship qualification for voting may be to maintain an incentive for aliens to become
citizens. However worthy that purpose may be, it is clearly an impermissible basis
for state legislation. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 97 S. Ct. 2120, 2126 (1977).
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group would voluntarily make that choice. Although the Supreme Court may be able to prevent the infliction of disproportionate
burdens on the members of a group, it cannot provide them with
disproportionate benefits. Aliens are unable to participate in the
political process-forming alliances, trading support, and acquiescing
in certain losses in order to make possible later gains-that permits
other groups to promote their own interests in the legislative
forum. 131 The denial to resident aliens of that opportunity can only
be justified on the basis of some compelling state interest. And it
is far from clear that it can, in fact, be justified under that exacting
standard.
131. See generally I.
45 (1965).
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